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Ten Years Fighting Hate
David A. Hall †
On October 28, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act (“the Act”). One of the goals of the Act was to
broaden protections against crimes motivated by hatred for a
person’s group membership (her perceived race, national origin,
gender or gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, or
religion). The Act intends to address the need for US law to
recognize the particularly destructive and virulent nature of
crimes motivated by this kind of animus toward minority groups.
Such crimes can often have an outsized effect, because they are
intended to terrorize not only the victim, but entire populations.
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Act, this Article
undertakes an endorsement of the Act in three Parts. The first Part
examines the history and logic underlying the Act and considers
challenges—both legal and philosophical—to the Act’s passage
and enforcement. The second Part reviews prosecutions under the
Act over the ten–year period from its enactment in 2009 through
2019, with consideration of variations in application among the
federal Circuits, and the types of crimes most–often prosecuted
under the Act. Finally, Part Three of this Article looks ahead to
ways in which the Act may be amended, improved, and
implemented over the next ten years—and beyond.
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my deep gratitude to Professors Dean Rivkin, Michael Higdon, Valorie Vojdik, Doug
Blaze, and Dean Melanie Wilson for their wise insights, practical suggestions, and
invaluable support through the writing and editing of this Article. I owe particularly special
thanks to Cynthia Deitle of the Matthew Shepard Foundation for trusting me with this
project, pointing me in the right direction, and talking me through the whole endeavor.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite how the current American climate may make some of us feel,
given that there are children being held in cages on our southern border, 1
transgender people told they’re so unwelcome they cannot even serve our
country in the military, 2 Muslim American citizens living in fear in their
own communities, 3 and on 4 and on 5 and on, 6 Donald Trump didn’t
actually invent hate. He has perhaps capitalized on it to a more successful
degree than any American ever has, but it’s nevertheless a fact of our
history that animus has been with us since long before this President has.
So, while it is undeniable that a treatment of the efforts to combat hate in
American society is particularly timely today, 7 there hasn’t been a point in
our history when it wasn’t timely. Hatred of “the other” is of course at the
root of what many have called this country’s original sin. 8 Hate killed
See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, ‘There Is a Stench’: Soiled Clothes and No Baths for
Migrant Children at a Texas Center, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
2
See, e.g., Andrew Chung & Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Court Lets Trump Transgender
Military Ban Stand, Orders New Review, REUTERS (June 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-trump-transgender/us-court-lets-trump-transgender-military-banstandorders-new-review-idUSKCN1TF1ZM.
3
See, e.g., FBI: Spike in US Hate Crimes for Third Year in a Row, BBC (Nov. 13,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-46189391; John N. Mitchell,
American Muslims Deal With Being Targets of Hate, WHYY (Mar. 16, 2019), https://
whyy.org/articles/american-muslims-deal-with-being-targets-of-hate/; Michelle Chen,
Trump’s ‘Muslim Ban’ Doesn’t Just Target Eight Countries. It’s Stoking Hatred Against
Muslims In America, NBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/
opinion/trump-s-muslim-ban-doesn-t-just-target-eight-countries-ncna868971.
4
See, e.g., Amber Phillips, ‘They’re Rapists.’ President Trump’s Campaign Launch
Speech Two Years Later, Annotated, WASH. POST (June 16, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trumpcampaign-launch-speech-two-years-later-annotated/.
5
See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Fans the Flames of a Racial Fire, N.Y. TIMES (July 14,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/politics/trump-twitter-race.html?module
=inline.
6
See, e.g., Rick Sobey, Activists: Trump’s ‘Hateful, Racist’ Speech Leading to Mass
Shootings, BOS. HERALD (August 4, 2019), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/08/04
/activists-trumps-hateful-racist-speech-leading-to-mass-shootings/.
7
For just one example of the timeliness of a discussion of hate crime, consider the
recent increase in crimes against transgender people. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Violence
Against the Transgender Community in 2019, https://www.hrc.org/resources/violenceagainst-the-transgender-community-in-2019 (counting twenty-two bias-motivated
murders of transgender people in the US in 2018, and an increase in that rate in 2019, to
nineteen murders over the first eight and a half months of the year).
8
See, e.g., Annette Gordon-Reed, America’s Original Sin: Slavery and the Legacy of
White Supremacy, 97 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2018); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations,
THE ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/thecase-for-reparations/361631/.
1
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Lincoln and Dr. King and Alan Berg and Heather Heyer and James Byrd,
Jr. and Matthew Shepard. And it is hate, of course, that inspires terrorism
in all its forms; from aiming planes at buildings, to burning crosses in
lawns, to opening fire on night clubs, churches, and latinx–frequented Wal
Mart stores.
But as long as hate has been around, so too has reason. And it is
logic—more, even, than love—that is hate’s true opposite number: Where
hate is witless and irrational, logic is reflective and restrained. Where hate
creates at best only calculated outbursts and designed tantrums, logic
produces sound judgment and good sense. Where hate is benighted, feral,
frantic, vacant, logic is circumspect, thoughtful, measured, compassionate.
Logic is at the core of the law. The law must serve a variety of needs:
Good law makes better citizens. It also helps law enforcement do its job
dispassionately and fairly. The law informs our actions and helps us
understand the extent both of our liberties and also our obligations to one
another as part of a functional social compact. Reason is required to
accomplish these aims, and good law is therefore inherently well–
reasoned.
Consider, for example, the noncontroversial law against burglary
(usually defined as breaking into another person’s home uninvited in order
to commit a crime 9). It accomplishes at least four goals: First, it helps
delineate my liberty—I can enjoy the expectation of freedom from
unwanted visitors while I’m in my home. Second, it helps establish our
obligations towards others—the law makes it clear that I have to respect
the boundaries of my neighbor’s property, even if I’d really like to make
off with his new 4K TV while he’s away. Third, clear and cogent law aids
legitimate law enforcement efforts; burglary statutes, for example, give
police objective criteria for determining whether my actions constitute a
crime, and prosecutors can develop standard lines of argument for
prosecuting cases. Fourth, good law encourages good behavior—in my
day–to–day life, I choose not to burgle, in part because I know I risk
punishment if I do. The law may not be able to change what’s in my heart,
but we need not ask that of it. Much more important is the fact that good
law is capable, in ways large and small, of changing my behavior. In this
way, good laws help make better communities.
In keeping with this line of argument, then, the first Part of this Article
examines the logic underlying the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,
Hate Crimes Prevention Act (the “Shepard–Byrd Act” or “the Act”). In
Part One, I give special attention to the reasons the Act was necessary, and
See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (defining burglary in part as “enter[ing] a
habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then open to the public, with
intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault.”)

9
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carefully consider opposition to the Act, in the form of both legal
challenges and also what might be considered challenges of philosophy.
In Part Two, I closely review application of the Act over the past ten
years, with attention both to broad trends—for example, variations in
enforcement among the various federal Circuits—and to narrow questions
of law—among them, how prosecutors have proved that charged crimes
“affected interstate commerce”—while also taking stock of the types of
crimes that are most–commonly prosecuted under the Act.
In Part Three, after having considered the Act’s past and present—its
origin and current application—I turn to the future and consider how the
Act might change our country over the coming decade, and how it might
itself be changed.

I.

THE HISTORY AND LOGIC OF THE ACT

This Article seeks to present a global review of the past ten years of
the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act in
order to broaden understanding of the Act and its origins and outcomes,
and to commemorate its achievements as a legal, philosophical, and social
phenomenon. To present the clearest possible picture, it’s helpful to
consider first the factual and political background out of which the Act
was created.

A.

The Factual and Political History

On the afternoon of June 7, 1998, as he was walking home from his
niece’s bridal shower in rural Jasper County, Texas, forty–nine year old
James Byrd, Jr. was kidnapped by three men who beat him and then
chained him to the back of their pickup truck and dragged him for
approximately one and a half miles before he was decapitated, 10 then
dragged his lifeless body another mile and a half farther, 11 because of their
“intense dislike of blacks.” 12
Exactly four months later and over a thousand miles north of Jasper,
in the early morning hours of October 7, 1998, in Laramie, Wyoming, a
University of Wyoming college student named Matthew Shepard was tied

10
Forensic evidence suggests that Mr. Byrd was alive and conscious throughout the
ordeal, until he hit the culvert that sheared off his head and right arm. Closing Arguments
Today in Texas Dragging-Death Trial, CNN (Feb. 22, 1999), http://www.cnn.com/US/
9902/22/dragging.death.03/.
11
3 Whites Indicted in Dragging Death of Black Man in Texas, CNN (July 6, 1998),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9807/06/dragging.death.02/index.html.
12
CNN, supra note 10.
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to a rail fence and beaten to death 13 because his attackers wanted to show
him “how [they felt] about gays.” 14
These two attacks were particularly brutal, but were otherwise
unconnected save for one strand, the same thread that connects both crimes
to other atrocities: lynchings in the American south, for example, and the
concentration camps at Auschwitz and Buchenwald, and the thousands of
reported (though not nationally infamous) attacks on LGBT victims, 15 and
the likely thousands more that are never reported. 16 They were, all of them,
crimes motivated by hate.
While the soul–numbing barbarity of these two crimes sets them apart,
their cruelty was not the only—nor perhaps the chief—reason that the
memories of their victims still animate the national conversation about
hate crimes. Nor was the cruelty of these crimes the only—or even the
main—reason that the expansion of federal hate crime legislation bears the
names of their victims. Rather, these crimes stuck in the national
consciousness long after the publicity and the trials, long after the names
of the attackers have been rightfully forgotten, because the relentless
efforts of the families of the victims made them stick.
It was the family and community of those who survived Mr. Byrd’s
and Mr. Shepard’s murders that most contributed to the lasting impact
those crimes ended up having on American law and society. In recognition
of their dedication, focus, and will, President Obama eventually credited
Mr. Shepard’s and Mr. Byrd’s families as “the spearheads of th[e] effort”
to enact the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes
Prevention Act. 17 The tenacity and bravery of Matthew Shepard’s and
James Byrd, Jr.’s families eventually bore fruit in the form of national
legislation that for many years had been sought—and eluded—by figures
no less luminary than Senator Ted Kennedy and President Bill Clinton. 18

Mr. Shepard was beaten and tortured shortly after midnight on October 7, and died of
his injuries on October 12 in a hospital in Fort Collins, Colorado, where he had been
airlifted after being found by a passing cyclist, some eighteen hours after the attack. About
Us, MATTHEW SHEPARD FOUND., https://www.matthewshepard.org/about-us/.
14
James Brooke, Witnesses Trace Brutal Killing of Gay Student, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/21/us/witnesses-trace-brutal-killing-of-gay-stu
dent.html?pagewanted=all.
15
Michelle A. Marzullo and Alyn J. Libman, Hate Crimes and Violence Against
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People, RESEARCH OVERVIEW (Hum. Rts.
Campaign Found.,Wash. D.C.), May 2009, at 2.
16
Id.
17
Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks Commemorating the Enactment of the
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (Oct. 28, 2009).
18
Clinton Urges Expansion of Hate Crime Law, CNN (April 6, 1999),
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/06/hate.crimes/.
13
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While the Shepard–Byrd Act is the first robust piece of federal hate
crime legislation, it is not the sole federal law on the issue of bias–
motivated crime. The first federal hate crime statute, Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, was signed into law by President Johnson as the third
of his “major” civil rights initiatives as President. 19 That statute mandated
fines and imprisonment as punishment for any person who “willfully
injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or
interfere with . . . any person because of his race, color, religion or
national origin . . . .” 20 However, Title I never offered a particularly
muscular set of protections, and even at its passage, it was overshadowed
by other provisions of the Civil Rights Act (particularly by Title VIII, the
“Fair Housing Act”). 21
Title I was styled as the “Federally Protected Activities” act, and its
name gave an indication of the first of its major deficiencies as a piece of
hate crime legislation. Rather than seeking to deter hate crimes per se, the
Federally Protected Activities portion of the 1968 Civil Rights Act instead
barred bad actors from committing one narrow strain of hate: it operated
solely against crimes aimed expressly at keeping protected classes from
engaging in specified activities. 22 That is, Title I didn’t apply to hate
crimes carried out on the basis of animus alone. It only applied if the
animus was intended to stop a person or group from voting, attending
school, or engaging in another protected activity; as the name indicates,
the Federally Protected Activities act sought to protect actions, not
necessarily the people who might be targets of hate.
The second significant deficiency of the Federally Protected Activities
act was its narrow class of protected persons. Not only did Title I apply to
a limited number of enumerated activities, but also it only banned crimes
against a narrowly drawn set of classes. As enacted, the Federally
Protected Activities act prohibited crimes of animus against a person based
on her “race, color, religion or national origin.” 23 It offered no protection
against crimes committed out of bias for a person’s gender, sexual
19
Steven R. Goldzwig, LBJ, the Rhetoric of Transcendence, and the Civil Rights Act of
1968, 6 RHETORIC & PUB. AFF. 25, 26 (2003).
20
18 U.S.C. § 245 (imprisonment for not more than one year, but up to ten years if the
offense causes bodily injury or includes dangerous weapons, and no maximum sentence if
the offense causes the victim’s death or includes kidnapping, sexual abuse, or an attempt
to kill).
21
The trend has continued among academics. For example, a Google Scholar search for
“18 U.S.C. § 245”—the Title I statute—returns 532 results. A search in the same location
for “25 U.S.C. § 1301” (the classification for Title II, the “Indian Civil Rights Act”), shows
nearly three times as many results, with 1,400 articles, and one for “42 U.S.C. § 3601”—
Title VIII, the “Fair Housing Act”—returns 3,620 results.
22
18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1).
23
18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2).
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orientation, gender identity or disability, regardless of the victim’s
participation in a “protected activity.”
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention
Act was not the first attempt to address either one or both of the major
shortcomings in Title I of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. In fact, no fewer than
twenty–six proposed hate crimes bills were introduced in the House and
Senate in the seventeen years preceding the enactment of the Shepard–
Byrd Act in 2009. 24 Most of these bills died in committee, even some that
enjoyed significant support in one (or both) chambers. 25 Most of those bills
were identical—or very nearly so—to the measure that eventually became
the Shepard–Byrd Act. So, what changed? What new forces came to bear
that pushed this bill over the tipping point into law? Almost certainly, it
was the addition of two factors: first, a canny bit of political tactics and
second, a mother who turned immense grief into meaningful action.

24
These include: (1) S. 2522, 102d Cong. (1992), the Hate Crimes Sentencing
Enhancement Act of 1992; (2) H.R. 4797, 102d Cong. (1992), likewise called the Hate
Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992; (3) H.R. 1152, 103d Cong. (1993), the Hate
Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993; (4) H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. (1997), the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 1997; (5) S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1997), the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 1998; (6) H.R. 77, 106th Cong. (1999), the Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 1999; (7) H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999), also denominated the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1999; (8) S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999), additionally titled the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1999; (9) S. 1406, 106th Cong. (1999), A bill to combat hate crimes; (10) H.R. 74,
107th Cong. (2001), the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2001; (11) H.R. 1164, 107th Cong.
(2001), the Native American Hate Crimes and Criminal Justice Grant Program Act; (12)
H.R. 1343, 107th Cong. (2001), the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2001; (13) H.R. 80, 108th Cong. (2003), the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2003; (14)
H.R. 4204, 108th Cong. (2004), the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2004; (15) H.R. 259, 109th Cong. (2005), the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005; (16)
H.R. 2662, 109th Cong. (2005), the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act
of 2005; (17) H.R. 254, 110th Cong. (2007), David’s Law; (18) H.R. 1592, 110th Cong.
(2007), the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007; (19) S. 1105,
110th Cong. (2007), the Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2007; (20) H.R. 2217, 110th Cong. (2008), the Hate Crimes Against the
Homeless Enforcement Act; (21) H.R. 6776, the David Ray Ritcheson Hate Crime
Prevention Act; (22) H.R. 6777, 110th Cong. (2008), the Noose Hate Crime Act of 2008;
(23) H.R. 70, 111th Cong. (2009), the Noose Hate Crime Act of 2009; (24) H.R. 256, 111th
Cong. (2009), the David Ray Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009; (25) H.R. 262, 111th
Cong. (2009), the David Ray Ritcheson Hate Crime Prevention Act; and (26) H.R. 1913,
111th Cong. (2009), the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009.
25
See, e.g., H.R. 1152, 103d Cong. (1993), the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement
Act of 1993 (this bill was introduced by then-Representative Chuck Schumer with 75 cosponsors, then passed a House vote, only to die in the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitution).
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To succeed, federal hate crimes legislation must overcome significant
Republican opposition in Congress. 26 The Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act would almost certainly have failed
without a Democratic majority in both houses in 2009. But a Democratic
majority in Congress was not sufficient to realize hate crime law;
Democrats held both houses from 1991–1994, when at least three versions
of hate crimes legislation were attempted and failed.27 Success almost
certainly also depended on a Democratic President to sign any bill. 28 Yet
in the first year of President Bill Clinton’s first term, even Democratic
control of both Congress and the Presidency proved insufficient to pass a
1993 attempt at hate crime legislation.
By 2009, though, the political climate in the country was changing,
due in no small part to the efforts of Judy and Dennis Shepard and the
Matthew Shepard Foundation they started in 1998. 29 Democrats in
Congress who supported hate crimes legislation that included protection
for the LGBT community were no longer just the vanguard of a movement
toward full equality and protections of a vulnerable minority; by 2009 they
were riding a wave of public opinion that had recently witnessed the end
of discriminatory “sodomy laws” 30 and the ordination of the first openly

26
For example, during debate over what would become the Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act, then-Senator Saxby Chambliss (R) of Georgia
offered a typical Republican response, insisting that hate crimes legislation was not only
“unnecessary” but that it was “irresponsible.” 155 CONG. REC. 10,671 (2009) (statement of
Sen. Chambliss).
27
S. 2522, 102d Cong. (1992), the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992;
its companion bill in the House, H.R. 4797, 102d Cong. (1992); and H.R. 1152, 103d Cong.
(1993), the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993.
28
After the House passed a hate crime bill in 2007, the George W. Bush White House
issued a statement threatening to veto any hate crime bill that might also pass a Senate vote,
calling such legislation “unnecessary and constitutionally questionable.” Richard Simon,
Hate Crime Bill Veto Is Vowed, L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2007), https://www.latimes.
com/archives/la-xpm-2007-may-04-na-hate4-story.html.
29
Some evidence of the enormous role the Matthew Shepard Foundation has played in
fighting hate in the U.S. is found in the fact that in October of 2018, twenty years after his
death, Mr. Shepard’s remains were interred in the Washington, D.C. National Cathedral
alongside other nation-changing figures such as Helen Keller and President Woodrow
Wilson. Michelle Boorstein, Matthew Shepard, Whose 1998 Murder Became a Symbol for
the Gay Rights Movement, Will Be Interred at Washington National Cathedral, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/10/11/matthewshepard-whose-murder-became-symbol-gay-rights-movement-will-be-interredwashington-national-cathedral/.
30
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that “when homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres.”).
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gay Episcopal bishop in the country, 31 and that would soon lead to the end
of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 32 and the invalidation of the Defense of Marriage
Act 33 and the birth of marriage equality.
The Matthew Shepard Foundation played a large role in convincing
American society that the community of LGBT people was just that—a
part of the American community made up of people who deserve the full
measure of protections and liberties afforded to all Americans. Mr.
Shepard’s death was unspeakably cruel, unbearably unfair. But through
the Foundation, his parents helped a nation see a common bond where his
attackers had seen something other, and to see humanity where his
murderers had seen less than.
But the tide of public opinion, influenced in part by the Matthew
Shepard Foundation, was not sufficient for success; after all, the
Foundation was doing its work throughout the preceding decade while
Congress tried—and failed—on numerous occasions to pass a hate crimes
bill. Success required a Democratic majority in Congress, a Democratic
President, the ceaseless efforts of a dedicated family of survivors, and a
groundswell of support for the cause, and yet all those together were not
enough. The final factor that turned the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd,
Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act into law was a bit of shrewd political
maneuvering: introducing the bill to a vote as part of the 2010 Defense
authorization bill. 34
As then–Senator John McCain of Arizona noted during debate, this
was not the first time an unrelated piece of legislation was introduced as
part of a defense–spending bill. 35 But the tactic was effective; despite a
majority of Congressional Republicans voting against the measure, 36 the
authorization act, along with the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,
Hate Crimes Prevention Act, passed a House vote on October 8th by a
nearly two–to–one margin, 37 passed the Senate by an even larger margin
on October 22nd, 38 and was signed into law six days later by President
Barack Obama on October 28, 2009. The Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act had become law. Having outlined
31
Laurie Goodstein, Openly Gay Man Is Made A Bishop, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/03/us/openly-gay-man-is-made-a-bishop.html.
32
10 U.S.C. § 654 (repealed, 2010).
33
1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); and
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
34
Defense Authorization Act of 2010, PUB. L. NO. 111-84.
35
Saying “there have been other times where provisions have been added to [the
Defense authorization bill].” 155 CONG. REC. 10,666 (2009) (statement of Sen. McCain).
36
131 of 177 House Republicans and 29 of 41 Senate Republicans voted against the bill.
37
The House tally was 281 - 146.
38
The Senate vote was 68 - 29.
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how the Act came about, we turn now to why it was both necessary and
sensible.

B.

The Need for an Expanded Hate Crimes Law

Before passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate
Crimes Prevention Act in 2009, there was no federal statute offering robust
protection from bias–motivated violent crime to anyone, not even the
people who were the most likely to be victims of such crime. 39 The closest
any federal statute came to hate crime legislation was Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (the “Federally Protected Activities Act”), and it only
protected a narrow class of persons, and then only if they were targeted for
engaging in a narrow, enumerated list of activities. In other words, under
that law a person could be convicted of a “hate crime” only if he had
violently victimized another person because of that person’s perceived
race, color, religion, or national origin, and then only if the victimizer
acted because—not simply while—the victim was attempting to engage in
a protected activity (e.g., enrolling in public school, or serving as a juror). 40
This restrictive structure meant that, for example, if a group of
Klansmen intended to pressure all black people to leave town by using the
terrorist tactic of beating a black woman to death on the street, they would
not be subject to prosecution under the Federally Protected Activities Act
if the woman was simply walking home, rather than, say, attempting to
enroll in a state college at the time of her attack.41 It also meant that a gay
man had no protection at any time under this law, even if his attackers
specifically acted in order to keep him from, for example, serving on a
jury. 42
According to the FBI, there are at least many thousands of bias crimes
committed each year in the US 43 (and likely many more; there’s no way
of precisely tabulating the number of hate crimes that go unreported, 44 and

39
Racial minorities. FBI, Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders by Bias
Motivation, 2017, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/tables/table-1.xls (The
FBI has tracked hate crimes committed against people on the basis of “race, religion, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity” since 1990, in accordance with the Hate Crime Statistics Act of
1990 (28 U.S.C. § 534)).
40
18 U.S.C. § 245.
41
Though hypothetical, this situation tracks closely with many of the thousands of hate
crimes perpetrated in the US each year. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T JUST. Hate Crimes Case
Examples, https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crimes-case-examples.
42
18 U.S.C. § 245.
43
Over 7,100 such crimes were counted in 2017 alone, the most recent year for which
statistics are available. FBI, supra note 39.
44
Although the U.S. Department of Justice estimates that the full figure amounts to more
than half of all hate crimes. Madeline Masucci and Lynn Langton, Hate Crime
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good reason to believe that many people do not report incidents of hate
crime to police 45). Of those, between 20% and 23% are committed against
persons who had no federal protection at all under the Federally Protected
Activities Act.46 Thus, before the Shepard–Byrd Act, about four in five
victims had federal protection against hate crimes only in specific,
narrowly–drawn circumstances, and another one in five victims enjoyed
no federal protection whatsoever.
The available evidence therefore demonstrates that over the last half
of the twentieth century, there was in fact a large group of Americans who
had no—or very limited—protection from hate crimes under federal law.
Perhaps a very natural next question, then, is this one: should they have?

C.

The Logical Basis for the Act

There are at least two equally compelling logical foundations for
robust hate crimes protections: the pro–Democracy approach, and the
anti–terrorism one. The former proceeds from the proposition that any
democracy worth the name must take seriously its obligation to protect its
minority members from the ever–present threat of a tyrannical majority. 47
Part of that protection must include physical safety, so if any minority
group is being specifically targeted for physical harm, a functional
democratic government must take steps to address that specific harm.
The manner in which any democratic government protects its citizens
is via the law; thus, in a nation in which minority groups are routinely
targeted for violence, in order to maintain a properly–functioning
Victimization, 2004-2015, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/hcv0415.pdf (hereinafter Victimization).
45
See, e.g., Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal-Justice
System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-thatthe-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the-proof/; Katie Gagliano and Emma Keith,
Lack of Trust in Law Enforcement Hinders Reporting of LGBTQ Crimes, NEWS21 (Aug.
15, 2018), https://hateinamerica.news21.com/lack-of-trust-in-law-enforcement-hindersreporting-LGBTQ-crimes/.
46
FBI, Hate Crime Statistics, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/publications#HateCrime%20Statistics. These percentages are calculated over the five-year span from 2013
to 2017, and include crimes committed on the basis of sexual orientation, gender, gender
identity, and disability, none of which groups were protected by the Federally Protected
Activities Act (in 2009, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention
Act mandated additional tracking of crimes motivated by bias against juveniles, and against
any person on the basis of actual or perceived gender, gender identity, or disability. Those
statistics first became available via the FBI’s hate crime database in 2013. PUB. L. 111-84,
123 Stat. 2190 § 4708).
47
See, e.g., Donna Lee Van Cott, Building Inclusive Democracies: Indigenous Peoples
and Ethnic Minorities in Latin America, 12 J. DEMOCRATIZATION 820 (2005); Steven
Wheatley, Deliberative Democracy and Minorities, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 507 (2003).
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democracy such a nation must enact laws that protect the targeted groups
from that violence. This type of legislation is what the US refers to as “hate
crime laws.” Such laws flow logically from the purposes of democratic
government and are indeed essential to the proper functioning of such a
government. This is the substance of the pro–democracy justification for
hate crime legislation.
The second main justification might usefully be called the anti–
terrorism position. It runs as follows: It is axiomatic that acts of terrorism
ought to be deplored by any legitimate government. The meaning of
“terrorist action” is to refer to crimes “of force and violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce.” 48 This definition makes
explicit that terrorism includes acts that are already legally prohibited per
se (the unlawful use of “force and violence”). Nevertheless, crimes of
terrorism demand special consideration because of their special nature.
Thus, for example, the charges against Zacarias Moussaoui for his role
in the 9/11 attacks included not only conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy,
conspiracy to murder, and conspiracy to destroy property (all crimes,
whether or not done with terrorist intent), but also conspiracy to commit
acts of terrorism. The especially heinous nature of crimes intended to
cause terror merits special charges and enhanced penalties. Such special
charges and enhanced penalties are therefore appropriate when—for
example—an individual takes actions calculated to “be particularly
intimidating” to a young girl and her family because they’re black. 49 These
appropriate special charges and enhanced penalties are achieved through
the use of hate crime laws.
The full run of the anti–terrorism stance is therefore: it is a legitimate
purpose of government to fight terrorism; terrorism means acting violently
to intimidate or coerce; intimidation and coercion are at the heart of bias–
motivated crime; government fights crime via legislation; thus it is a
legitimate purpose of government to enact legislation specifically barring
bias–motivated crime.
Many thousands—perhaps millions 50—of Americans are victims of
hate crimes, and for the purposes of promoting democratic ideals and of
fighting terror, hate crime laws are a natural and logical extension of the
proper role of the federal government. Hate crime law, in other words, is
a logically necessary response to a significant problem. Yet it is
28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (emphasis added).
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Grapevine Texas Man Pleads Guilty to Federal Hate Crime
Against an African-American Family (July 12, 2018) (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
grapevine-texas-man-pleads-guilty-federal-hate-crime-against-african-american-family).
50
Three million hate crimes victims between 2004 and 2015, according to U.S.
Department of Justice estimates. Victimization, supra note 44.
48
49
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nevertheless not without its detractors. Those can be divided into two main
camps: the philosophical opponents, and the legal challengers.

D.

Opposition to the Act

Opponents of hate crime legislation on theoretical or political grounds
(those who might be called philosophical opponents) typically structure
their opposition in one of four main ways: (1) hate crime law is duplicative
and therefore unnecessary; (2) it is arbitrary in its selection of protected
groups; (3) it is ineffective as a deterrent; and (4) it amounts to codification
of an overreaching government attempt at “thought–crime” legislation.
None of these arguments stands up to serious scrutiny.
Writing in the New York Times, self–described gay activist and civil
libertarian Bill Dobbs neatly sums up the position that hate crime law is
not necessary, arguing that “existing criminal laws cover every victim,
revered or reviled alike,” and for this reason, “hate crime laws selectively
recriminalize acts that are already crimes.” 51 This view is perhaps the most
facially plausible of the main arguments against hate crime laws, but it
fails because it does not take into account the measurable difference
between crimes motivated by bias and those motivated by greed or passion
or other nondiscriminatory intent: their impact on a broader community.
Hate crime law is not duplicative, because hate crimes are different
from other types of crime. For much the same reason that additional
terrorism charges supplemented the indictment against Zacarias
Moussaoui after the events of 9/11, hate crime charges reflect the
penumbra of larger harms done by acts of bias when compared to
nonbiased crime. Chief among those larger harms is the effect that hate
crime has on the victim’s community. In his meticulously researched book
Punishing Hate, Frederick Lawrence takes note of this phenomenon,
finding that hate crimes make people other than the immediate victim feel
personally victimized, afraid, and under attack. 52
In this way, hate crimes are fundamentally different from similar
crimes: they cause greater harm than “parallel” crimes that aren’t bias–
motivated. 53 Hate crimes are intended to send a message to a targeted
group: you are different, lesser, unwelcome, and you should be afraid. And
as Lawrence notes, they work. It is precisely because of that fact that hate
crime law is a necessary tool. Hate crimes have outsized effects that ripple
Bill Dobbs, Justice, Not Vengeance, for Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/07/are-hate-crime-laws-necessary/justi
ce-not-vengeance-for-hate-crimes.
52
Frederick M. Lawrence, Punishing Hate 41 (1999).
53
Id. at 41–2 (“This additional harm of a personalized threat felt by persons other than
the immediate victims of the bias crime differentiates a bias crime from a parallel crime
and makes the former more harmful to society.”)
51
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across communities, and for that reason enhanced sentencing measures
aren’t unneeded: they are essential.
A second major philosophical argument tendered against hate crime
law is that it is idiosyncratic or arbitrary in its selection of protected
groups. This argument is typified (albeit with perhaps a dash more
rhetorical spin than other thinkers might employ) by columnist Tish
Durkin’s contention that “the whole concept of hate crimes is absurd,”
because it amounts to “codify[ing] the idea that certain kinds of human life
have greater value than other kinds.” 54 However, this line of argument fails
to take note of the fact that there is an evidence–based approach a society
can take (and one which ours has taken) toward determining which groups
merit special protection: it’s the ones that need protecting. 55
The Shepard–Byrd Act does not arbitrarily or randomly offer
protection to the LGBT community. The Act protects the LGBT
community because that community is under attack. The argument that
laws aimed at protecting specific groups are unfairly exclusive thus finds
a neat parallel in the image of a homeowner complaining that the
firefighters pouring water on his neighbor’s burning home are showing the
neighbor “special treatment.” Well, sure. But it’s just because your house
isn’t the one on fire. If hate crime laws are underinclusive (leaving out
groups that need protection), that’s an argument for broadening them, not
doing away with them. And if they are overinclusive (and there’s no
evidence to suggest that current legislation protects groups who are not
specially targeted for bias crimes), then they ought to be properly
calibrated. But the bare fact that hate crime laws protect certain groups is
a simple mathematical reflection of the fact that hate crimes target certain
groups.
A third philosophical critique of hate crime laws opposes them by
arguing that they are ineffective, presumably because even after the
enactment of the Shepard–Byrd Act (and similar state laws against hate
crimes), hate and its attendant bias–motivated crimes still exist. 56 This
Tish Durkin, Focus on the Crime, Not the Victim, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/07/are-hate-crime-laws-necessary/foc
us-on-the-crime-not-the-victim.
55
One minor branch of the “arbitrary protection” strand of criticism is the contention
that by “singling out” specific groups for protection, hate crime laws further marginalize
those groups. It seems self-evident that the proper response to this contention is to point
out that it is the perpetrators of violent bias-motivated crime who are doing the
marginalizing, and not the law that seeks to punish such behavior.
56
The Wall Street Journal published a representative sample of this line of argument, in
which the author proposes the notion that hate crime laws are “a bad idea” because “such
statutes don’t seem to deter much.” Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Are Hate-Crime Laws
Helping?, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-hate-crimelaws-helping-11550878156.
54
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argument merits little more attention than to note that state and federal
laws against murder, theft, and assault, for example, have likewise failed
(even after centuries of effort) to fully eliminate those crimes from
American life.
In other words, the fact that a law has not eradicated a prohibited
behavior presents simply no argument at all against it. However, it should
be further noted that there is some evidence to suggest that, rather than
being ineffective, hate crime laws in fact may reduce the overall rate of
violent crime. 57 Data from the FBI’s crime statistics database showed that
as recently as 2014, states that had enacted hate crime legislation had lower
rates of violent crime overall, including lower murder, assault, and even
property crime rates. 58 This relationship of course doesn’t demonstrate the
existence (or direction) of a causal link. It doesn’t prove that the enactment
of hate crime laws causes a decrease in other crimes. But it needn’t do that
to be compelling; indeed, the most plausible alternate explanation for the
correlation—that the kind of society that enacts hate crime laws is the kind
of society that produces fewer overall crimes—still functions as an
argument for, rather than against, pushing society toward more robust hate
crime legislation.
The final main philosophical argument against hate crime laws takes
the position that such laws, in seeking to punish the motivation for a
behavior and not only the behavior itself, constitute the creation of an
intolerable category of “thought crimes.” An early and representative
articulation of this line of thinking from The National Review declared
support for hate crime laws to be an “odd view,” because such laws seek
“to punish the motive for the crime as well as the crime itself.” 59 As though
motive had not been a component of criminal law for as long as the
common law has existed! As though intent were not already the basis for
enhanced charges throughout state and federal law!
There is an illustrative example alluded to earlier in this Article: If a
man breaks into a Texas home without permission, he has committed a
misdemeanor punishable by up to 180 days in jail. 60 If he does so intending
to steal the homeowner’s new 4K TV, he has committed a felony
punishable by up to twenty years in prison—whether or not he actually
steals anything. 61 If there’s any valid argument against enhanced
sentencing based on the criminal’s motive, calling it an “odd view” isn’t
John A. Tures, How Hate Crimes Laws May Help Reduce All Crimes, OBSERVER
(Mar. 14, 2019), https://observer.com/2019/03/hate-crimes-laws-reduce-all-crimes-data/.
58
Id.
59
James Q. Wilson, Hate and Punishment, THE NAT’L REV. (Sept. 13, 1999), archived
at https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/07/hate-and-punishment/ (emphasis added).
60
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.22 and 30.05.
61
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33 and 30.02.
57

2020]

TEN YEARS FIGHTING HATE

95

it. The contention that hate crime legislation is tantamount to an
unacceptable governmental intrusion into people’s inner minds carries
with it more than a whiff of the straw man argument; the observable
evidence shows that hate crime laws make no more attempt to dive into
the criminal’s thoughts than do other laws relying crucially on intent.
It’s worth returning for a moment to the extra “conspiracy to commit
terrorism” charge in the Moussaoui case, to note that the enhanced
punishment attendant to that charge is only sustained by an appeal to what
Moussaoui was thinking. 62 Indeed, the same can be said of every federal
conspiracy charge. Hate crime laws are not “thought crime” laws, any
more than conspiracy charges or heightened punishments for intent are
thought crime laws.
In addition to the preceding theoretical arguments, opponents of the
Shepard–Byrd Act have mounted constitutional challenges against it,
running along three main lines: (1) that the Act violates First Amendment
free speech protections; (2) that it exceeds Congress’ authority under the
Thirteenth Amendment; and (3) that it violates the Equal Protection
Clause. These challenges warrant only brief consideration here, because
these issues appear to be well–settled at this point.
Two cases from the Sixth Circuit present a consistent position on the
First Amendment question. In both, Defendants’ challenges against the
Shepard–Byrd Act on free speech grounds were denied. 63 In a case arising
in the Eastern District of Michigan in 2012, the Sixth Circuit began by
noting that “the legislative history [of the Shepard–Byrd Act] shows that
the term ‘violent acts’ . . . is not intended to include ‘violent thoughts,’
‘expressions of hatred toward any group,’ or ‘the lawful expression of
one’s deeply held religious or personal beliefs.’” 64 With those facts in
mind, the court dispensed with the First Amendment issue in plain
language, holding that “the [Shepard–Byrd] Act does not prohibit . . .
speech.” 65
In a more recent case in which defendants did raise a successful appeal
of their Shepard–Byrd convictions, 66 their convictions were reversed on
the narrower ground that the lower court had committed non–harmless
error. 67 In that case, the appellate court made explicit the lack of any First
62
18 U.S. Code § 371 (making it an offense to plan to commit an offense, even if the
other planner was the only one who actually committed the offense).
63
See U.S. v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014); Glenn v. Holder, 690 F.3d 417 (6th
Cir. 2012).
64
Glenn, 690 F.3d at 421.
65
Id.
66
Miller, 767 F.3d 585.
67
Id. at 591 (holding that the jury instruction at the lower court inadequately conveyed
the nature of the causal element required to convict under the Shepard-Byrd Act).
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Amendment defect in Shepard–Byrd, holding that “the government may
punish ‘bias–inspired conduct’ without offending the First
Amendment . . . .” 68 This articulation of the constitutional propriety of the
Shepard–Byrd Act seems particularly weighty because, having reversed
defendants’ convictions on other grounds, the court did not need to reach
the constitutional question. That it took pains to articulate a cogent defense
of the Act’s constitutionality suggests there is no serious argument left to
the contrary.
Similarly, a recent Tenth Circuit case in which the defendant raised
Thirteenth Amendment and Equal Protection challenges illustrates the
propriety of Shepard–Byrd on both counts. 69 On appeal, the defendant
argued that the Act was unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded
its Thirteenth Amendment authority in passing it.70 The court demurred,
ruling that in passing the Shepard–Byrd Act, Congress had “met the Jones
test in rationally determining racially motivated violence to be a badge or
incident of slavery,” and was therefore “authorized [under the Thirteenth
Amendment] to enact the racial violence provision of the Hate Crimes
Act.” 71 This holding is consistent with Fifth and Eighth Circuit
jurisprudence on the question. 72 The Shepard–Byrd Act is well within
congressional purview under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Finally, when deciding Hatch, the Tenth Circuit considered a
challenge on Equal Protection grounds and found no Fifth Amendment
deficiencies in the Act. On appeal in that case, the defendant argued that
the Shepard–Byrd Act violated the Equal Protection Clause by “mak[ing]
distinctions on the basis of race.” 73 The court needed only four paragraphs
to dispose of the question, holding that “Hatch’s argument does not raise
an equal protection problem” because “Congress is authorized under the
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to legislate in regard to
every race and individual.” 74 The court further reasoned that the Act “does
not limit its reach to members of formerly enslaved races, but explicitly
protects ‘any person’,” and for that reason, too, it “does not run afoul of
equal protection principles.” 75 Thus the Shepard–Byrd Act is properly
Id. at 592.
United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013).
70
Id. at 1196.
71
Id. at 1206.
72
See United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 505 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
Shepard-Byrd Act is “is a valid exercise of congressional power” under the Thirteenth
Amendment); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026, 1031 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that
Defendant’s Thirteenth Amendment challenge provided “no substantial argument as to
why the particular scope of [the Shepard-Byrd Act] renders it constitutionally infirm.”).
73
Hatch at 1209.
74
Id. at 1208.
75
Id. at 1209.
68
69
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within constitutional parameters on every point of contention. It is
precisely through these challenges that the strength of a law is revealed: in
this way, the Act’s constitutionality has thus been clarified beyond any
serious question.
Ten years of history now demonstrate the utility and propriety of the
Shepard–Byrd Act. It is necessary, it is logically coherent, and it is legally
sound. For these reasons, it has survived political, philosophical, and
constitutional challenges.

II.

APPLICATION OF THE ACT

The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention
Act has been used only sparingly in the ten years following its enactment.
According to data culled from Department of Justice press releases and
records of cases that went to trial,76 the Act has been used in fifty–six
prosecutions since 2009. 77 In those cases, thirty–four indictments resulted
in guilty pleas, thirteen led to a trial on the merits, and the remaining nine
cases currently await trial. 78 What follows is an overview of the types of
crimes that are most–commonly charged under the Act, the variations in
application of the Act among the federal Circuits, and an examination of
some legal issues involved in prosecuting cases under the act.

A.

Prosecutions by Type

The Shepard–Byrd Act bars bias–motivated crimes against persons on
the basis of six signals of group membership: race or national origin, 79
Appendix I, HCPA Prosecutions by Disposition.
This number may not represent the entire universe of prosecutions under the Act. For
example, using data culled on a case-by-case basis “from the internal administrative
information recorded by each U.S. Attorney’s Office,” the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse (a data-collection website sponsored by Syracuse University) counts eightyfive prosecutions under Shepard-Byrd. TRAC, Few Federal Hate Crime Referrals Result
in Prosecution, https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/569/.
However, in a phone conversation, Cynthia Deitle, former FBI Civil Rights Unit Chief
responsible for managing the FBI’s national Hate Crimes Program, raised questions about
the accuracy of the Syracuse data. Given these questions and the near impossibility of
reaching a fully accurate dataset (see Part III, Section A, infra), this Article will proceed
with a treatment of those prosecutions that have been publicly verified by the Justice
Department.
78
Appendix I.
79
These are presented in the statute as three separate classes: race, color, and national
origin. As a practical matter, though, they are usually folded together as a single category.
For example, the FBI denominates “Race/Ethnicity/Ancestry” as a single group in its
compilation of hate crime statistics. See, e.g., FBI, Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known
Offenders by Bias Motivation, 2017, https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017/topic-pages/
tables/table-1.xls.
76
77
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religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender, and gender identity. 80 An
investigation into the application of the Shepard–Byrd Act in prosecutions
shows that it has been used most commonly in cases involving crimes of
bias against people on the basis of race. 81 This tracks with the larger
picture on bias–motivated crime: race or national origin is consistently and
by far the largest motivation for hate crimes in the US, comprising—as a
recent example—58% of all such crimes counted by the FBI in 2017. 82
Some examples of recent cases may help fill in the picture of the current
state of hate crime and its prosecution in America.
The most–recent indictment under the Act for violent crime on the
basis of race or national origin alleges that on Nov. 27, 2018, one Alan D.
Covington of Salt Lake City, Utah, entered a tire store brandishing a metal
pole and shouting that he wanted to “kill Mexicans.” 83 The indictment
alleges that Covington then struck one victim in the head in an
unsuccessful attempt to kill him, then struck and injured another victim
and attempted to strike a third, who evaded the blow. 84 The case is
currently awaiting trial. 85 In the sweep of its facts, it is fairly typical of the
brutality and animus at work in crimes prosecuted under the Act.
For example, the indictment in another case now awaiting trial—this
one from Jeffersontown, Kentucky—alleges that Gregory A. Bush, “after
substantial planning and premeditation,” brought a firearm to a Kroger
grocery store, where he shot two men to death and attempted to shoot a
third “because of their race.” 86 Other recent prosecutions have made
national headlines, such as that of James Alex Fields, Jr., who pled guilty
earlier this year to charges that included killing Heather Heyer in 2017 by
accelerating his car into a crowd of pedestrian protesters at the
Charlottesville, West Virginia “Unite the Right” rally,87 and that of Dylann
Roof, who was sentenced to death in 2017 for killing nine people by
opening fire on an historically black church in Charlotte, South Carolina. 88
18 U.S.C. § 249.
Exactly half of prosecutions—28 of 56—were for crimes motivated by bias against
the victim’s race or national origin. Appendix II, HCPA Prosecutions by Motivating Bias.
82
FBI supra note 79.
83
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Utah Man Charged With Hate Crimes For Attacking Three
Men With a Metal Pole, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/utah-man-charged-hate-crimesattacking-three-men-metal-pole.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Kroger Shooting Suspect Charged with Federal Hate
Crimes and Firearm Offenses, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kroger-shooting-suspectcharged-federal-hate-crimes-and-firearm-offenses.
87
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to 29 Federal Hate Crimes for
August 2017 Car Attack at Rally in Charlottesville https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohioman-pleads-guilty-29-federal-hate-crimes-august-2017-car-attack-rally-charlottesville.
88
See United States v. Roof, 225 F. Supp. 3d 413 (D.S.C. 2016).
80
81
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The foregoing are all typical of race–based crimes of animus 89 in that
they involve attacks on victims that were previously unknown to their
assailants: one of the features of bias is that it tends to be directed toward
persons perceived as “other,” and this sort of “otherization” can function
as an assailant’s mental defensive precursor to cruelty. 90
That sort of cruelty is on high display in cases involving animus
against a person for his sexual orientation, 91 which comprise the second–
largest type of animating bias among charges filed under the Shepard–
Byrd Act. 92 These crimes often present as particularly brutal, because they
often involve luring a victim into a violent trap by the attacker’s feigned
romantic or sexual interest in the victim. A recent indictment out of Dallas
is typical: Daniel Jenkins and Michael Atkinson are charged with a string
of assaults on a number of gay men after luring them to an apartment
complex by posing as potential dates on the social media platform
Grindr. 93
89
See also Press Release, Dep’t Just., Two Biddeford, Maine, Men Indicted for Hate
Crime Assault, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-biddeford-maine-men-indicted-hatecrime-assault (indictment alleging two assailants attacked a man they did not know in a 7Eleven parking lot; defendants are now awaiting trial); Press Release, Dep’t Just., Kansas
Man Pleads Guilty to Hate Crime and Firearm Offenses in Shooting of Two Indian
Nationals and Third Man at a Bar, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kansas-man-pleadsguilty-hate-crime-and-firearm-offenses-shooting-two-indian-nationals-and
(defendant
pleaded guilty to shooting and attempting to kill two med he’d never met “because of their
race, color, religion, and national origin”); Press Release, Dep’t Just., Suburban Pittsburgh
Man Pleads Guilty to Hate Crime, https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/suburbanpittsburgh-man-pleads-guilty-hate-crime (defendant pleaded guilty to willfully causing
bodily injury because of his victim’s “perceived race, color, and national origin”); Press
Release, Dep’t Just., Ohio Men Sentenced to Prison for Racially Motivated Attack on
Stranger, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-men-sentenced-prison-racially-motivatedattack-stranger (both defendants pleaded guilty after attacking a man they saw on the street
“in the name of the White Race.”); Press Release, Dep’t Just., Kansas Men Sentenced for
Roles in Federal Hate Crime Against Black Somali Men, https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/kansas-men-sentenced-roles-federal-hate-crime-against-black-somali-men
(defendants both pleaded guilty to attacks “because of [their victim]’s race and national
origin,” and “without any justification”).
90
Taylor N. West, Leah Savery & Robert J. Goodman, Sometimes I Get So Mad I
Could . . . : The Neuroscience of Cruelty, in THE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY,
COMPASSION, AND SELF-COMPASSION, 121, 123 (Larry Charles Stevens & C. Chad
Woodruff eds., 2018).
91
The victims are almost always men. For example, so far every victim of a crime
charged under the Act as motivated by bias toward sexual orientation has been a man, save
one.
92
Almost a quarter of prosecutions—13 of 56—were for crimes motivated by bias
against the victim’s actual or perceived sexual orientation. Appendix II, HCPA
Prosecutions by Motivating Bias.
93
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Dallas Men Indicted for Hate Crimes for Targeting Gay
Men on Grindr, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/dallas-men-indicted-hate-crimestargeting-gay-men-grindr.
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In a similar crime, also in Texas, two Corpus Christi assailants pleaded
guilty to having invited a man to an apartment, where they “assaulted him
while calling him racial and homophobic epithets . . . [o]ver the course of
approximately three hours.” 94 In another case, again in Texas, Brice
Johnson pleaded guilty to beating his victim sufficiently severely to cause
“multiple skull and facial fractures” after luring him to his home by telling
the victim “that he was interested in engaging in sexual activity with
[him].” 95
In yet another similar offense, yet again in Texas, three men pleaded
guilty to using Grindr to arrange a meeting with their victim in his home,
where they tied up, assaulted, and robbed him. 96 These types of bias crimes
aren’t all committed in Texas, but they do share the animating hatred of
difference, and many of them also involve the tactic of luring the victim
by making a false offer of companionship, then doling out brutality.
The third–largest group of prosecutions under Shepard–Byrd are
crimes motivated by animus against a victim on the basis of his or her
perceived religion. Unlike race and sexual orientation motivated crimes,
crimes committed out of bias against the victim’s religion tend to be larger
scale, often involving multiple victims. This is in large part due to the fact
that such crimes frequently involve attacks on places of worship, where
they can maximize damage on faith communities. 97 The mass shooting at
the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh is a prototypical example of this
kind of crime. A forty–four–count indictment in that case charges Robert
Bowers with the deaths of eleven congregants who were engaged in
94
Press Release, Off. U.S. Att’y, Two Texas Men Indicted for Federal Hate Crime
Against Gay, African-American Man, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/hou
ston/news/press-releases/two-texas-men-indicted-for-federal-hate-crime-against-gay-afric
an-american-man.
95
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Texas Man Pleads Guilty to Violent Kidnapping of Gay
Man, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/dallas/news/press-releases/texas-manpleads-guilty-to-violent-kidnapping-of-gay-man.
96
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Two Texas Men Plead Guilty to Federal Hate Crime for
Assaults Based on Victim’s Sexual Orientation, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-texasmen-plead-guilty-federal-hate-crime-assaults-based-victim-s-sexual-orientation.
97
See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t Just., Ohio Man Indicted for Attempting to Provide
Material Support to ISIS and Attempting to Commit a Violent Hate Crime Attack Against
a Toledo Synagogue https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-man-indicted-attemptingprovide-material-support-isis-and-attempting-commit-violent-hate [hereinafter Toledo]
(indictment alleging that Damon M. Joseph planned to carry out a mass shooting on a
synagogue (which plan was interrupted by FBI involvement), and that he had chosen “the
types of weapons he believed would be able to inflict mass casualties”) ; Press Release,
Dep’t Just., Jury Convicts Texas Man of Hate Crime in the Burning of Victoria, Texas,
Mosque, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jury-convicts-texas-man-hate-crime-burning-vict
oria-texas-mosque (Defendant was convicted of burning a mosque with the aim of
“instilling fear into entire communities with violence.”).
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religious worship on October 27, 2018. 98 According to the indictment,
Bowers opened fire on the synagogue during services because of his stated
desire to “kill Jews.” 99 Bowers is currently awaiting trial. 100
While the Tree of Life Case is both prototype and paradigm for other
such crimes, 101 it is not the sole representative of crimes committed on the
basis of animus against a person’s religion or perceived religion; that is,
not all such crimes are carried out at the remove afforded by explosive
devices or assault weapons. For example, last year in Nashville,
Tennessee, one Christopher Beckham was indicted on charges of violating
the Shepard–Byrd Act after he allegedly brandished a knife and punched
a man in the street, yelling “Allahu Akbar!” and “Go back to your
country!” 102
It merits at least cursory mention that the mixed messages allegedly
shouted by Beckham in the course of this attack are typical of the blind
and unthinking nature of these crimes: the attacker may not be sure if he
hates his victims because of their religion, or their national origin, but he
definitely knows he hates them. Bias crimes motivated by religious animus
have formed the basis for eleven prosecutions under Shepard–Byrd since
2009.
There have been so far only two prosecutions under Shepard–Byrd of
crimes motivated by bias against persons with disabilities. The first was in
Pennsylvania, where five co–conspirators were charged with kidnapping
multiple persons with mental disabilities, and “subject[ing them] to
subhuman conditions of captivity,” including beating them, “[keeping]
them captive in locked closets, basements and attics, depriv[ing] them of
adequate food and medical care,” and shuttling them between locations in
four states in order to avoid detection. 103
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Pennsylvania Man Charged with Federal Hate Crimes for
Tree Of Life Synagogue Shooting, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pennsylvania-mancharged-federal-hate-crimes-tree-life-synagogue-shooting.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
For example, it served as an exemplar for the planning of a similar attack in Ohio that
was foiled by FBI before it could be realized. Toledo, supra note 97 (Joseph, who planned
an assault weapon shooting on a synagogue in Toledo, said of the Tree of Life shooter “I
admire what the guy did with the shooting actually . . . I can see myself carrying out this
type of operation”).
102
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Nashville Man Indicted For Hate Crime And Lying To The
FBI, https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdtn/pr/nashville-man-indicted-hate-crime-and-lyingfbi (Beckham was also indicted on charges of lying to the FBI after he falsely claimed that
the daughters of the man he is alleged to have attacked began the altercation by striking
him).
103
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Federal Charges Allege Captors Held Adults with
Disabilities in Subhuman Conditions to Carry out Social Security Fraud,
98
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The second case alleges perhaps the most brutal and cruel of all the
cases prosecuted under the Act, charging abuse that included locking the
victim in a cage, hitting her with a hammer and with a board, holding her
under water and burning her, along with multiple other atrocities. 104 The
five charged defendants currently await trial in Amite, Louisiana. 105
The final case meriting special mention here is particularly noteworthy
for two reasons: First, it’s the only case of a bias crime involving animus
against a person’s actual or perceived gender identity that’s been
prosecuted to date under the Shepard–Byrd Act. Second, it involves a hate
crime that could only have been prosecuted under Shepard–Byrd, because
it occurred in Mississippi, a state that has no hate crime statute protecting
against bias directed toward a person’s gender identity. In another
exceptionally brutal set of charges, Joshua Vallum was indicted for
murdering his ex–girlfriend, a young woman whom Vallum knew to be
transgender. 106 Vallum pleaded guilty to stabbing her multiple times,
shocking her with a stun gun, and finally beating her to death with a
hammer. 107
In discussing the case later, US Attorney General Loretta Lynch
offered a concise recapitulation of one central justification for the
existence and application of hate crime law: “Our nation’s hate crime
statutes advance one of our fundamental beliefs: that no one should have
to live in fear because of who they are. By holding accountable the
perpetrator of this heinous deed, we reinforce our commitment to ensuring
justice for all Americans.” 108

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-charges-allege-captors-held-adults-disabilities-sub
human-conditions-carry-out-social.
104
Emma Discher, 5 Charged for Holding Autistic Amite Woman in Cage, Accused of
Beating Her Among Other Heinous Acts, THE ADVOCATE (July 26, 2018),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f1a5395a-912211e8-b819-33860076b559.html; Caroline Grueskin, Alleged Ringleaders Plead Guilty in
Abuse of Autistic Woman; Was Kept in Cage, Fed Mother’s Ashes, THE ADVOCATE (May
20,
2019),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/communities/livingston_tangipahoa/arti
cle_9fabde80-7b35-11e9-9fc5-236d748f322e.html.
105
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Amite Residents Charged with Civil Rights Crimes for
Abusing Family Member with Disabilities, https://www.justice.gov/usao-edla/pr/amiteresidents-charged-civil-rights-crimes-abusing-family-member-disabilities.
106
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Mississippi Man Pleads Guilty to Hate Crime for
Murdering Transgender Victim Because of Her Gender Identity, https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/mississippi-man-pleads-guilty-hate-crime-murdering-transgender-victim-becauseher-gender.
107
Id.
108
Id.
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Prosecutions by Federal Circuit

There is a fairly significant disparity in federal prosecutions under the
Shepard–Byrd Act among the federal circuits. Data from US Justice
Department press releases and from those cases that have proceeded to
trial show that the Act has been used in successful prosecutions in twenty–
eight states throughout each of the federal circuits (except for the D.C.
Circuit). 109 However, the Act has been used far more often in some circuits
than in others, and for different types of bias–motivated crime.
Prosecutors in the Fifth Circuit have brought more charges under the
Act than those in any other circuit. 110 The Ninth Circuit has seen the next–
highest number of charges, followed by the Sixth. 111 None of the other
circuits have been home to more than five prosecutions under Shepard–
Byrd. 112
The predomination of charges brought in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
is largely due to the higher number of race–motivated crimes prosecuted
in those circuits. 113 However, those circuits account together for only two
prosecutions of religious–motivated crimes, while over one–third of such
charges were brought in the Sixth Circuit. 114
The large number of sexual orientation motivated prosecutions in
Texas is the main reason that the Fifth Circuit is the largest prosecutor of
such crimes by a fairly wide margin (it is home to over a third of all
prosecutions under the Shepard–Byrd Act for crimes committed on the
basis of bias against a person’s actual or perceived sexual orientation). 115
At the other end of the spectrum, three circuits have been home to only
a single Shepard–Byrd prosecution each: the First, Second, and
Seventh. 116 In the First Circuit, the sole indictment came in Arkansas for
a race–based case. 117 The lone charge within the Second Circuit was for a
crime based on religious animus in New York, and the only indictment in
the Seventh Circuit came from Wisconsin, and was also a case motivated
by religious bias. 118

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Appendix I.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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Establishing the Elements

The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention
Act prohibits two central crimes: (1) bias–motivated violent crimes
committed on the basis of animus against a person’s actual or perceived
race or religion; 119 and (2) bias–motivated violent crimes committed on
the basis of animus toward a person’s actual or perceived sexual
orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability while the defendant or
victim is engaged in interstate commerce. 120
Since 2009, thirteen cases including charges under Shepard–Byrd
have gone to trial. Of those, twelve have resulted in convictions (though
in two of those convictions, the federal hate crime charges were later
dismissed and the defendants were convicted on other charges,121 and in a
third, the defendant was convicted of some charges but acquitted of the
Shepard–Byrd charge 122) and one defendant was acquitted. 123 Among the
nine Shepard–Byrd convictions, six were for race–based crimes, two were
religious–bias–based, and one was sexual–orientation–based.
The first six convictions fall into the first class of crime prohibited by
the Act; proving up the elements requires prosecutors to show that the
defendant “willfully cause[d] bodily injury to any person or, through the
use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary
device, attempt[ed] to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the
actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin.” 124 No
elements within that list have proved controversial in prosecutions on the
basis of race–based animus. 125
However, it must be noted that the relative ease of demonstrating bias
within successful prosecutions most likely appears only via hindsight: that
is to say, it’s much more likely that charges are brought—and convictions
obtained—in cases where the motivating animus was clear and evident.
As with other crimes relying crucially on proving mens rea, 126 difficulties
are necessarily bound up in demonstrating the bias that motivates hate
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1).
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2).
121
U.S. v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Mason, Helen Jung, Pink Poodle
Case: Federal Hate Crime Count Dropped as Defendant Pleads Guilty to Oregon Charge,
THE OREGONIAN (May 16, 2014), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2014/05/pink
_poodle_case_federal_hate.html.
122
United States v. Jenkins, 909 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
123
United States v. Henery, Case No. 1:14-cr-00088-BLW (D. Idaho Feb. 14, 2014).
124
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (emphasis added).
125
Though it should be noted (and will be discussed further in Section D, infra) that the
phrase “because of,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(A) became the hook on which the
Sixth Circuit reversed federal hate crime charges in Miller. Miller, supra note 121.
126
See generally Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or
Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21 (2001).
119
120
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crimes. In successful prosecutions, prosecutors have met this challenge by
demonstrating that the victim was previously unknown to the assailant 127
and that the defendant used racial epithets before, during, and after the
crime, 128 or that the defendant displayed insignia that demonstrated racist
intent (e.g., having racist or white supremacist tattoos 129).
There have been three appeals in cases involving Shepard–Byrd
charges for race–based crimes. 130 All three appeals resulted in affirmations
of the lower courts’ convictions. 131 The appeal in United States v. Hatch
did not propose any question as to the charged elements, instead resting
entirely on constitutional challenges, all of which the court found
meritless. 132 The other two cases—from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits—
are of more interest, particularly in light of subsequent and contrary Sixth
Circuit reasoning. 133
In United States v. Cannon, Defendants argued that there was
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that they had caused injuries to their
victims because of racial animus. 134 The appellate court held that
Defendants’ use of racial epithets gave indication of their motivation, and
that the use of language cues to infer intent did not offend the First
Amendment. 135 In its opinion, the court held that “speech–based evidence
[is allowable] to support a finding that a crime was motivated by racial
hatred.” 136 The court did not propose a test for determining whether an
action was taken “because of” racial bias, holding only that in the present
case, “a rational trier of fact could have found the essential element of
racial motivation beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence
presented.” 137
The appeal in United States v. Maybee likewise challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence, and on the same ground: that there was
insufficient proof that Maybee had attacked his victims because of their
actual or perceived race. 138 Here, the Eighth Circuit rejected Maybee’s
See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2012).
128
See, e.g., Maybee.
129
See, e.g., Cannon.
130
United States v. Cannon, 750 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hatch, 722
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Maybee, 687 F.3d 1026 (8th Cir. 2012).
131
Id.
132
Hatch at 1196 (“The sole question before us is whether the portion of the Hate Crimes
Act under which Hatch was convicted . . . is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s
power . . . .”).
133
To be discussed further in Section D, infra.
134
Cannon at 505.
135
Id. at 508.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 506.
138
Maybee at 1031.
127
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claim by applying what might be called a “substantial factor” test.139 The
court held that the racial epithets Maybee hurled at his victims constituted
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that race–based animus
formed “a substantial motivating factor in Maybee’s decision” to terrorize
his victims. 140 This test is of particular note, because it rubs against the test
used by the Sixth Circuit in a later case involving the “because of”
component in the second offense defined in the Act. 141
The second offense defined by the Shepard–Byrd Act prohibits
violence (1) on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability, and (2) when that violence is connected to interstate commerce.
Prosecutors in the four cases have satisfied the second condition despite
some controversy, 142 and the Eastern District of Kentucky offers a
plausible explanation for their success in its detailed, eight–page analysis
of the question in denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss United States v.
Jenkins. 143 That analysis concludes that the deciding factor in proving that
a violation of the Act has a sufficient connection to interstate commerce is
accomplished straightforwardly, thanks to the presence of a “jurisdictional
element” within the statute. 144 The court here is referring to Section
249(a)(2)(B), which defines the circumstances that would “trigger” a
relation to interstate commerce: most importantly, when a defendant
makes use of “a channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign
commerce.” 145 According to the Jenkins court, this interstate commerce
element can be met if the assailant only uses a car in the course of the
crime: “cars are themselves instrumentalities of commerce, which
Congress may protect.” 146
Recent jurisprudence from the Fourth Circuit provides additional
support for this expansive view of interstate commerce. After a trial in
which a defendant admitted to having violently assaulted an Amazon
coworker at their workplace and “because of the coworker’s sexual
orientation”—and was subsequently convicted by the jury—the district
court overturned the conviction, holding that Shepard–Byrd “exceeds
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” 147 The Fourth Circuit
Id. at 1032.
Id.
141
Section D, infra.
142
Two of the four cases involved appellate review. However, the first was resolved on
other grounds, without reaching the interstate commerce question, and the more recent case
saw the Fourth Circuit affirm the Act’s constitutionality. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d
188 (4th Cir. 2019); U.S. v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014).
143
United States v. Jenkins, 909 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766–73 (E.D. Ky. 2012).
144
Id. at 770.
145
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(i)(II).
146
Id. at 771.
147
United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 2019).
139
140
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reversed, holding that rather than exceeding congressional purview, the
Act in fact “easily falls under Congress’s broad authority to regulate
interstate commerce.” 148 In the same line of thought as the one employed
by the Jenkins court, the Fourth Circuit reached its decision relying in part
on the presence of a “jurisdictional element” within the Act 149 (the Fourth
Circuit found additional support for the constitutionality of the conviction
in the specific facts of the case, holding that the defendant’s assault on his
victim while the latter “was preparing packages for interstate sale and
shipment—amounts to a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce,”
because of the “aggregate effect” such assaults would have on
commerce 150).
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the “interstate
commerce” condition has been sufficiently well–defined within the Act
(using the hook of a “jurisdictional element”) to avoid significant
controversy in application, while creating an element for proving a hate
crime that prosecutors have been able to demonstrate when appropriate
and on a case–by–case basis.

D.

Acquittals and Dismissals

Of the one hundred nine individuals indicted over the fifty–six
Shepard–Byrd cases since 2009, defendants in four cases have mounted
successful defenses against their hate crime charges. Those cases included
two not–guilty verdicts on hate crime charges 151 and two cases in which
defendants’ hate crime convictions were subsequently dismissed (though
in both of those the defendants were convicted on other charges). 152
The earlier of the two not–guilty verdicts came in United States v.
Jenkins, and is perhaps explained by the simple fact that it was “the
country’s first prosecution of a hate crime on the basis of sexual
orientation.” 153 The charges stemmed from two male defendants using two
female codefendants to lure a man whom the four believed to be gay into
their pickup truck, in order to kidnap and assault him. 154 The case is
curious, because the two female codefendants pleaded guilty to the
148

Id.
Id. at 204.
150
Id. at 203–04.
151
United States v. Henery, Case No. 1:14-cr-00088-BLW (D. Idaho Feb. 14, 2014);
United States v. Jenkins, 122 F. Supp. 3d 639 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
152
U.S. v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Mason, Helen Jung, Pink Poodle
Case: Federal Hate Crime Count Dropped as Defendant Pleads Guilty to Oregon Charge,
THE OREGONIAN (May 16, 2014), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2014/05/pink
_poodle_case_federal_hate.html.
153
Jenkins at 642.
154
Id.
149
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Shepard–Byrd charges, thereby becoming the first defendants convicted
under the Act for a crime motivated by sexual orientation bias. 155
However, the male defendants pleaded not guilty and were acquitted of
the hate crime charge (though convicted of all other charges). 156
Perhaps the most curious detail of the case is that although the two
male defendants were not convicted of having attacked their victim as a
result of hate, the court held during sentencing that “For these four, the
consequences of their choices were violent decisions filled with
hate . . . .” 157 That is, two of the defendants admitted having—and the
court evidently also found—a motivation for the violent attack that the
members of the jury did not find.
The second not guilty verdict came in a case in which the Shepard–
Byrd charge (that the attack was motivated by racial bias) was the only
charge. 158 In that case, two white men were involved in a fight with a black
man inside a strip club. 159 After hearing evidence from “several”
eyewitnesses that the defendants had used racial slurs before and during
the fight (and hearing, too, the contrasting testimony of the two defendants
themselves, who both testified) an all–white jury found the pair not guilty
of a hate crime. 160 Given the acquittal, the precise nature of the defense’s
success can only be guessed at, though a contemporaneous description
indicates that the central defense strategy was to argue that the altercation
amounted to no more than a bar fight, with no component of racial
animus. 161
In two other cases, defendants had charges against them under the Act
dismissed. In the first of the two, United States v. Mason, a mistrial was
declared after the jury hung on the question of whether the defendant’s
attack on his victims had been motivated by bias toward their perceived
sexual orientation. 162 In that case, the defendant was driving when he saw
a pair of men walking on the sidewalk. 163 He stopped his car, yelled an
Id. at 644.
Id.
157
Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
158
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Two Idaho Men Indicted for Hate Crime,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-idaho-men-indicted-hate-crime.
159
John Sowell, Jury: Pair Not Guilty in Alleged Hate Crime at Boise Strip Club, IDAHO
STATESMAN (Feb 13, 2015), https://magicvalley.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/jurypair-not-guilty-in-alleged-hate-crime-at-boise/article_c6b06df6-b3d5-11e4-b6eda39e3ea055bc.html.
160
Id.
161
United States v. Henery, Case No. 1:14-cr-00088-BLW (D. Idaho Feb. 14, 2014).
162
Helen Jung, Pink-Poodle Case: Jury Deadlocks Over Whether Attack on Gay Man
Was Hate Crime, THE OREGONIAN (Feb 4, 2014), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/
2014/02/pink-poodle_case_jury_deadlock.html.
163
Id.
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156
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epithet at the pair, then assaulted them. 164 Speaking to reporters after the
mistrial, the presiding juror said that testimony from a linguistics professor
at Brigham Young University who testified as an expert in the case was
key to jurors’ doubts about the defendant’s motivation. 165 Before a second
trial could commence, the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree
assault, and the court dismissed the Shepard–Byrd charge. 166
The second dismissal is the more interesting and carries the greater
likelihood of continuing legal impact. It came on appeal to the Sixth
Circuit in the case that became United States v. Miller. 167 In their appeal,
Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against them,
arguing that there were not in the record enough facts to show that they
had shaved the beards and heads of a group of Amish men and women
because of religious animus. 168 The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding that the
proper test for determining whether a crime was committed “because of”
bias, as the term is used in the second prong of the Shepard–Byrd Act, is
to ask whether the bias was a “but for cause” of the defendant’s action. 169
This test raises the bar considerably for proving this element when
compared against the Eighth Circuit’s “substantial factor” standard: under
the Sixth Circuit test, bias must be a necessary component of the
motivation for the action, where the Eighth Circuit test requires only that
bias be a motivation for the action.
In the Miller case, this heightened standard resulted in a reversal of
the hate crime convictions. 170 The appellate court held that the lower court
had committed non–harmless error when it gave a jury instruction that did
not indicate that a guilty verdict required the jury to find that religious
animus was a “but for” cause of the assaults. 171 That is, the Sixth Circuit
held that unless a jury is persuaded that an attack would not have occurred
without an animating bias, then no hate crime charge can be sustained.
It is difficult as yet to gauge the future impact of this holding. The
facts in Miller lend themselves in a particular fashion to this holding; after
all, the defendants and the victims belonged to the same religion. 172 The
164

Id.
Id. (“William Eggington, a linguistics professor at Brigham Young University,
testified that the slur [that Defendant used] is often used among boys or by a coach to
challenge someone’s masculinity as opposed to conveying an anti-gay sentiment.”).
166
Helen Jung, Pink Poodle Case: Federal Hate Crime Count Dropped as Defendant
Pleads Guilty To Oregon Charge, THE OREGONIAN (May 16, 2014), https://www.
oregonlive.com/portland/2014/05/pink_poodle_case_federal_hate.html.
167
U.S. v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014).
168
Id. at 589.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 594.
171
Id.
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Id. at 589.
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first post–Miller Sixth Circuit case to be prosecuted on religious–animus
grounds appears to have adequately demonstrated “but for” cause; it ended
in a conviction. 173 There may be no significant wait to see how the Sixth
Circuit’s current thinking on causation affects other cases: there are
currently three more Shepard–Byrd cases (two of them alleging religious
animus, and the third alleging racial bias) awaiting trial in Ohio, Kentucky,
and Tennessee. 174 All of those states, of course, are in the Sixth Circuit.

III.

LOOKING AHEAD

Federal legislation that touches social issues 175 often inhabits a
symbiotic relationship with national social mores, pulling the country into
a national dialog that can result in changes both to the legislation and to
the nation’s character. Consider, for example, the way that President
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal led to a widespread belief that caring for
the welfare of its citizens was a legitimate role of the federal
government, 176 or the way that President Reagan’s restructuring of the tax
code led to a socio–economic realignment along the divide between the
1% and the 99%. 177 The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate
Crimes Prevention Act similarly touches an American social nerve, and as
Jenny Pizer, of LGBT–rights group Lambda Legal put it, although the
social effect of hate crime laws is not to “transform attitudes overnight,”

Press Release, Dep’t Just., Ohio Man Convicted of Hate Crime in Attack Outside
Cincinnati Restaurant, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-man-convicted-hate-crimeattack-outside-cincinnati-restaurant.
174
Press Release, Dep’t Just., Kroger Shooting Suspect Charged with Federal Hate
Crimes and Firearm Offenses, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kroger-shooting-suspectcharged-federal-hate-crimes-and-firearm-offenses; Press Release, Dep’t Just., Ohio Man
Indicted for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIS and Attempting to Commit a
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nevertheless such measures “do help, and that matters.” 178 As the
Shepard–Byrd Act begins its second decade, it’s worth considering how
the Act and the country it seeks to serve may evolve.

A.

Changes to the Code

Some current thinking on federal hate crime legislation suggests two
major modes of possible future change, one through amendment to the
Shepard–Byrd Act, and a second via additional legislation: (1) the addition
to the Act of a mandatory reporting requirement; and (2) the creation of a
new private right of action against the sorts of bias–motivated misdeeds
that are currently only addressed within hate crime law.
Advocates for the addition to the Act of a new and mandatory
requirement for law enforcement to report instances of hate crimes point
to the divide between data on the actual incidents of hate crime (as
compiled by the National Crime Victimization Survey) and those counted
by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report. 179 They also note that participation
in the Uniform Crime Report is currently voluntary, and for this reason
many states only report data from a small percentage of law enforcement
agencies. 180 Thus, advocates for mandatory reporting argue that currently
“there is simply no reliable national data on hate crimes.” 181
This underreporting is deeply problematic for national efforts aimed
at fighting and preventing hate crime. It minimizes the true scope of the
problem while inculcating divisions in the way states approach solutions.
Accurate reporting would not, of course, solve anything in its own right.
But it does appear to be a crucial step toward building and implementing
an effective set of solutions, in much the same way that before any doctor
prescribes a remedy, she first gathers an accurate diagnosis. After all, how
can we possibly fix a problem when we don’t even know fully where and
to what extent it exists?
Requiring law enforcement to report incidents would function as an
important part of a national approach to a national problem. Current data
demonstrate that hate crimes affect many thousands of people. But what if
David Crary, Views Are Mixed On Hate Crime Law Named For Matthew Shepard,
AP NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/a6d811ece9254facbc68df40d20e931
a.
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See, e.g., THE MATTHEW SHEPARD FOUND., Hate Crimes Reporting and Prevention
Initiative, https://www.matthewshepard.org/hate-crimes-reporting/ (concluding that
“Statistics published by the FBI’s Hate Crimes Report are likely not catching a majority of
estimated actual hate crimes.”)
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the actual number is many hundreds of thousands? An accurate count
would allow for the creation of rational, full–scope solutions based on
evidence. As it currently stands, federal law (in the Shepard–Byrd Act)
improves protections for victims but may not yet go far enough. Getting
better numbers would be a useful step toward creating an even better law.
Improving existing law is not the only way to fight hate crimes.
Another avenue is through the creation of a new federal private right of
action against attackers. Proponents of this addition argue that a civil
avenue by which victims could seek redress would carry with it several
benefits, among them (1) immunizing prosecutions from political
influence; (2) lowering the burden of proof for holding perpetrators
accountable; and (3) deterring future crimes. 182
The argument runs in part that prosecutorial discretion leaves some
crimes unpunished, in part for political reasons. 183 Allowing victims to
seek their own redress through civil court would circumvent this potential
problem; rather than rely solely on an intermediary (the state), victims
could take up their own cause directly and seek a measure of justice from
civil court. Additionally, a civil right of action would likely lead to
increased accountability from perpetrators, since instead of prosecutors’
need to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, civil claimants need only
show liability by a preponderance of evidence. Further, the argument goes,
a civil judgment could act as a sort of brand, in much the same way that a
sex offender registry marks sexual predator. Fear of being labeled as a hate
crime offender, together with the increased likelihood of being found
liable in a civil suit, may prove to be an increased deterrent for people who
might otherwise be inclined to commit crimes motivated by their bias.
Taken together, these factors constitute a cogent argument for creating a
new weapon in the fight against hate crime.

B.

Changes to the Country

Although equitable federal legislation that reflects the cultural
primacy of the rule of law can have an effect on the so–called “national
character,” it is by no means the only—nor the strongest—force acting on

See, e.g., Samuel Duimovich, Note, A Critique of The Hate Crimes Prevention Act
Regarding its Protection of Gays and Lesbians (And How a Private Right Could Fix It),
23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 295 (2014).
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considered factors such as cost, each proceeding’s impact on the defendant, the defendant’s
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the country’s prevailing disposition on social questions. 184 Nevertheless,
it is without doubt that the law is both colored by and colors our national
identity, as evidenced by the rapid change in the national perception of
such disparate issues as same–sex marriage 185 and gun control. 186
Hate crime legislation also has the power to change the country and
not only to be changed by it. A recent poll by POLITICO and Harvard
T.H. Chan School of Public Health showed that Americans’ fourth–
highest priority for its federal government—higher than addressing the
opioid epidemic and increasing funding for K–12 public education—was
for Congress to “increase[e] efforts to reduce the number of hate
crimes.” 187 Clearly, this disposition isn’t informed solely by the presence
of federal hate crime law; it’s much more likely that the current existence
of such law simply creates a baseline notional possibility for a federal
solution, and that the recurring—and widely reported—instances of hate
crimes do more to move the needle. But that’s really the point; if there
weren’t hate crimes, there’d be no need to strengthen hate crime laws, nor
to sway public opinion.
However, the current wave of sentiment prioritizing stronger federal
hate crime law suggests the future may be better. After all, we tend not to
solve the problems that we do not really want to solve; deciding together
that hate crime is an important problem is an indicator that we may indeed
take further steps to eradicate it. And in much the same way that changes
to federal law helped change American minds on other social issues, it is
likely that a deeper commitment to, and strengthening of, the Matthew
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Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act may lead to
stronger denunciations of hate crime, and fewer instances of it.

CONCLUSION
Like any good law, the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate
Crimes Prevention Act is practical, logical, and necessary. Its origin and
application reflect the reality of the times and culture in which we live.
While it’s been used only sparingly, it has been used successfully, and its
very existence signals the importance to American society of affording
special protection to those among us who need it. This is, after all, the
work required of a functioning democratic government, and doing it
strengthens our communities and our democracy. In coming years, as the
culture that the Act responds to and reflects undergoes inevitable change
(and, one hopes, growth), wisdom urges that the Act ought to change with
it, in modulated and appropriate ways. Such is the nature and substance of
good law.

